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In most macroeconometric models, a larger budget
deficit leadstoanappreciation ofa nation'scurrency and
ariseinitstradedeficitonlytotheextentthatitdrivesup
thedifferential between interestratesathomeandabroad.
In contrast, Mundell'spioneering worksuggeststhatarise
inthebudgetdeficitdoesthesethings withoutanychange
in the interest rate differential because market expecta-
tions adjust instantaneously to the effects ofthe larger
budgetdeficit. TheFRBSFmacroeconometric modelsyn-
thesizes thesetwoapproaches bymakingtheexpected real
value ofthedollarafunctionofcurrentfiscalpolicies both
athomeandabroad.Theresultisthatbudgetdeficits have
asignificantly largerinfluence ontheexchange rate, anda
smaller impact on interest rates, than in most macro
models. Consequently, expansionaryfiscalpolicytendsto
crowd out net exports more than interest-sensitive ex-
penditures.
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There are two distinct views in the literature on the
causal nexus between fiscal policy and the real valueofthe
dollar.The view that has gained ascendancy inrecent years
is that expansionary US. fiscal policy appreciates the real
valueof the dollar onlyto theextent it puts upwardpressure
on US. real interest rates and increases the differential
between US. and foreign real interest rates. According to
this view,the long-run equilibrium value of the dollar does
not change, and the real value ofthe dollar is bid up in the
short-run to the point where the real interest rate differ-
ential compensates forthe dollar's expected depreciation in
the future. Because it causes interest rates and the dollar to
rise, expansionary fiscal policy crowds out both interest-
sensitive expenditures and net exports. Most multicountry
econometric models incorporate this view. However, re-
cent simulations of these models suggest that this viewcan
explain only about one-halfof the dollar's rise after 1980.1
An alternative view consistent with the pioneering work
of Robert Mundell (1963) stresses that because of an
adjustmentin expectations, capital inflowscan be attracted
tofinance aU.S. budget deficit evenwith noincrease inthe
real interest rate differential. Assuming the market regards
the US. budget deficit as lasting more than temporarily,
the market's longer-run expectation of the real valueof the
dollar will rise. This change in expectations, in turn,
produces an appreciation in the real valueof thedollar.The
higher dollar, then, creates a "twin deficit" in the trade
balance, which allows actual capital inflows to take place
without there being any increase in the differential be-
tween U.S. and foreign real interest rates. Except to the
extent that the fiscalexpansion also raises theworldlevelof
interest rates, only net exports would be crowded out
according to this view.2
A synthesis of these two views is possible. By em-
bedding a rational expectations model of the dollar's
longer-runequilibriumintothe short-rundynamics of asset
equilibrium, these two distinct linkages among fiscal
policy, the dollar, and trade imbalances can be captured.
Such a synthesis is modeled empirically in the interna-
tional sector of the FRBSF macroeconometric model,
which is used for forecasting and policy simulations at the
27Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco." This paper de-
scribes the international sector of the FRBSF model and
assesses the relative quantitative importance of each of
these two linkages.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviewsthe
conventional approach to modeling the effects of fiscal
policy on the dollar and the trade balance. Section II
discusses the unique features of the international sector of
theFRBSF macroeconometric model and thedeterminants
ofthe real value of the U.S. dollar during the 1980sin this
model. Section III contrasts the simulated effects of a
sustained shift in fiscal policy on the dollar and the trade
balance obtained from the FRBSF model with those ob-
tained from a conventional model. Finally, Section IV
provides a summary and conclusions.
The difference between the current real exchange rate
and itsexpected future value-thatis, theexpected change
in the real value of the currency-is thus proportional to
the real interest rate differential. A central aspect of this
theory is the importance of term structure effects. For
example, assuming n is 10, a one-percentage point rise in
the one-year U.S. real interest rate relative to the foreign
one-year rate would cause the 1O-year rate in the U.S. to
increase by 0.1 percentage points (assuming future one
year interest rates are not expected to change as well), and
the real value of the dollar to go up only one percentage
point. In contrast, a one percentage-point increase in the
U.S. one-year rate that is expected to last for ten years
would cause the 1O-year U.S. bond rate to rise by one
percentage point and the real exchange value of the dollar
to rise by 10percentage points. So the same movement in
the one year rate generates different movements in the
exchange rate depending on the change in the 10yearrate.
Thus, if movements in long- and short-term interest rates
arenotperfectly correlated, the movementinthe long-term
realinterest rate differential controls movementsinthereal
exchange rate. In the short run, the expected real long-run
equilibrium value of the dollar does not change, and the
current exchange rate movesin proportion tothelong-term (1) InEXCH - InEXCHe = n[(i-pe) - (i*-pe*)]
I. Conventional Model of Fiscal Policy in an Open Economy
Most macroeconometric models, including the FRBSF where: EXCH = current real valueof thedollar,defined
model, are disaggregated, dynamic versions of the basic as units of foreign currency per unit of
IS-LM model on the demand side, with gradual wage and domesticcurrency deflated bytheratio
price adjustments on the supply side. In addition, most of foreign prices to domestic prices
models assume the degree ofinternational capital mobility EXCHe = realvalueofthedollar expectednyears
is relatively high, so that interest rates have a direct and in future
significant effect on the exchange rate. The most direct = U.S. nominal interest rate on security
approach assumes perfect capital mobility and perfect maturing in n years
asset substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds, i* = foreign interest rate on security matur-
so that expected yields-including the portion due to ing in n years
expected changes inexchange rates-are equalized at any pe = expected U.S. (annualized) inflation
moment in time. The availableevidence suggests that this rate over n years
is a reasonably good approximation to reality for major pe* = expected foreign (annualized) infla-
industrialized countries." Although not all macroecono- tion rate over n years
metric models assume perfect asset substitutability, the
interest rate differential and expected rate of appreciation
or depreciation in the exchange rate are among the impor-
tant explanatory variables determining the level of the
exchange rate in most of them.5
Perfect capital mobility and the trade account's slow
adjustment to changes in exchange rates, in turn, imply
that exchange rates are determined in the short run by
equilibrium in the market for financial assets, rather than
by equilibrium between current international flows of
goods and capital." Assuming securities at home and
abroad are perfect substitutes for one another, the asset
theory of the exchange rate requires that the difference
between the nominal returns on securities of a given
maturity at home and abroad is equal to the expected
percentage change in the nominal exchange rate over that
period. This iscalled the "open interest parity condition."
If, for example, the rate differential exceeded the expected
depreciation in the exchange rate, market arbitrage would
bid the value of the exchange rate up until its expected
depreciationoverthe relevanttime horizonequaled the rate
differential. It is easily shown that this arbitrage condition
also holds in real, or price-adjusted terms." Thus,
28 Economic Review I Summer 1989interest rate differential. In the longer run, however, the
expected real exchange rate tends to be consistent with the
long-run equilibrium value of the exchange rate, so that
with perfect asset substitutability, real interest rates at
home and abroad tend to be equalized.
The implications of using the open interest paritycondi-
tion to determine the exchange rate in the short run can be
illustrated in the basic IS-LM framework. For this short-
run analysis, fixed wage rates are assumed, but changes in
thereal value of the dollar are allowed to havean impacton
the price level. For the moment, the foreign real interest
rate is assumed to be fixed. The conventional approach
assumes that the expected real value of the dollar in the
long run is a constant, determined by the condition of
purchasing power parity. This implies that the current real
valueof the dollar can be expressed as a simple function of
the U.S. long-term real interest rate. The result is that the
absolute value of the slope of the IS schedule (locus of
equilibrium in the goods market) is less than it wouldbe in
aclosedeconomyon account of the indirect responseof net
exports to the real interest rate occurring through the real
exchange rate.
A further aspect of the open interest parity condition is
the effect on the slope of the LM schedule (locus of
equilibrium in the money market). An appreciation in the
real valueof the dollar reduces prices both directly through
thelowerrelative price levelofforeign goodsand indirectly
through the competitive pressures placed on domestic
producers of tradable goods. Therefore, as the real interest
rate and real value of the dollar rise, theprice levelfallsand
therealstock of money rises. This effect tends to reinforce
the reduction in the quantity of money demanded at the
higher rate of interest, resulting in aless steeply slopedLM
schedule than in a closed economy.
The effect of a fiscal expansion in this conventional
frameworkis illustrated in Figure 1.Assume that U.S. and
foreign real interest rates are initially at r1, with the
equilibrium U.S. real GNP at y.. A fiscal expansion, due
to either an increase in government spending or a cut in
taxes, would shift the IS schedule from ISj to IS2, raising
the U.S. real interest rate to r2 and U.S. real GNP toh.
RealGNP would rise through an increase in the velocityof
moneyproduced by higher interest rates. However, therise
in interest rates would offset a portion of the initial effects
of fiscal expansion by contracting domestic investment,
andpossibly also consumption, and also bycontracting net
exports through the associated appreciation in the real
value of the dollar.
The conventional exchange rate analysis, based on
interest differentials alone, implicitly assumes that any
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
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change in fiscal policy is not expected to last, so that the
expected long-run real value of the dollar is not affected.
Thus, fiscal policy affects the real value of the dollar only
through its influence on the current differential between
U.S. and foreign real interest rates. A U.S. fiscal expan-
sion opens up a positive interest rate differential which
appreciates the exchange value of the dollar so as to equate
expected yields. Moreover, fiscal crowding out in these
models always falls partly on interest-sensitive domestic
expenditures since a positive interest rate differential
would not be sustained if the dollar were to rise by enough
to place all the crowding out on net exports.
One problem with this approach is that changes in fiscal
policy generally are fairly long lasting. As a consequence,
expectations that the exchange rate will return to its
original level will continually be disappointed. Specifi-
cally, the actual real exchange value of the dollar will
exceed the expected value as long as the fiscal expansion
lasts. That is, as long as the fiscal expansion lasts, the
expected depreciation will notoccur. Thus, itseemslogical
that the market eventually would begin to revise its expec-
tation of the long-run exchange rate upward. In doing so,
the current real value also would rise and the positive real
interest differential in favorof the U.S. would fall until the
longer-run equilibrium of no differential between U.S. and
foreign real interest rates eventually would be reached.
This process is depicted in Figure 1. The rise in the
expected real value of the dollar has the effect of shifting
the IS schedule downward (through a reduction in net
exports at any given interest rate), and the LM schedule
downward also (through the increase in the real stock of
29money caused by an appreciating dollar). As long as the
U.S. real interest rate exceeds the foreign real interest rate,
the current exchange rate will continue to exceed the
expected exchange rate, and the IS and LM schedules will
continue to shift down through an adaptive adjustment of
expectations until a full equilibriumat r j , and Y3 is reached
at the intersection of LM3 and IS3.8
II. International Sector of the FRBSF Macroeconometric Model
......
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Figure 2
Effects of U.S. Fiscal Expansion
When U.S. and Foreign Assets
Are Perfect Substitutes
demand is spent on imports, the U.S. fiscal expansion
also shifts up the locus of full employment equilibrium
for the rest of the world, Grow, through the increased
demand for rest-of-the-world net exports. But most of the
rise in world aggregate demand falls on U.S. output, so
GUs shifts up by more than Grow. The larger increase in
demandin the U.S. appreciates the real value of the dollar,
which in turn diverts private demand away from U.S.-
produced goods towards foreign-produced goods. A gen-
eral equilibrium is restored at point b, where the higher
level of world interest rates dampens the excess world
aggregate demand created by the U.S. fiscal stimulus, and
the dollar appreciation dampens the relative excess de-
mand for U.S.-produced goods."
However, it is possible for the dollar to depreciate if
investors come to think that at some point, foreigners will
demand a higher return on U.S. assets to absorb an
increasingly large share of U.S. debt in foreign portfolios.
Thus, in explaining current movements in the dollar, a
fundamental issue is whether the market believes U.S. and















A key feature of the FRBSF macroeconometric model is
that it treats the expectedreal valueof the dollar in the long
run (EXCHe) as an endogenous variable determined by
expectations of future fiscal policy. As a result, current
fiscal policy influences the dollar through another channel
besides the current level of interest rates. By altering
expectations of future fiscal policy, it also influences the
real value of the dollar through its effect on the expected
real value of the dollar. The magnitude of the effect
operating through this additional channel depends upon: 1)
the size of the effect of changes in current fiscal policy on
expectations of future fiscal policy, and 2) the size and
directionoftheeffect ofexpected future fiscal policy on the
expected real value of the dollar.
The effect of future fiscal policy on the real value of the
dollar can be modelled in a two-country (the U.S. and the
rest of the world), long run, or full employment, equi-
librium framework. Dornbusch (1983)and Dornbusch and
Blanchard (1984) have suggested a useful diagrammatic
approach, shown inFigure 2. Thelocus offullemployment
equilibrium in the United States is given by G~s. This
schedule slopes downward because at full employment an
increase in the real value of the dollar reduces net exports,
and so must be offset by the higher U.S. spending brought
aboutby a lower U.S. real interest rate. Similarly, the locus
of full employment equilibrium for the rest of the world
slopes upward. A rise in the dollar expands net exports
abroad and so must be offset by a higher real interest rate
abroad to produce an offsetting change in aggregate de-
mand. Assuming perfect capital mobility and perfect asset
substitutability, real interest rates will equalize in the long
run, and full employment equilibrium will occur at the
intersection of these two schedules, at point a. At this
intersection, real interest rates in the two countries are
equal, and the real exchange rate produces trade balances
that are consistent with full employment. Equilibrium
capital flows, in turn, are mirror images of the trade
balances.
A U.S. fiscal expansion increases domestic demand for
U.S. goods and services. This shifts the U.S. schedule to
the right from G~s to Gys because, for any given real
exchange rate, higher U.S. real interest rates are needed to
offset the rise in domestic spending and restore equi-
librium. Since some of the increase in U.S. domestic
30 Economic Review / Summer 1989...
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Figure 3
Effects of U.S. Fiscal Expansion
When U.S. and Foreign Assets
Are Imperfect Substitutes
substitutes. Ifmarkets come to expect imperfect substitu-
tion between U.S. and foreign assets, a risk premium for
holding U.S. assets (that is, a real yield differential) would
have to be included in equation (1) and also in Figure 2.
Figure 3 shows the long-run effect of a fiscal expansion
in this case. Assume there is no risk premium initially
because portfolios are balanced, with the initial equi-
librium at point a in Figure 3. The U.S. fiscal expansion
shifts the GUs and Grow schedules upward as in Figure 2.
But as the risk premium, or yield differential, grows with
the accumulation of U.S. debt by foreigners, it drives a
wedge (equal to cd) between real interest rates in the U.S.
and abroad. The new equilibrium is no longer at point b,
but rather at a lower value for the dollar. Indeed, a stable
long-runequilibriuminthiscase requires an increase inthe
risk premium by enough to depreciate the real valueof the
dollar.Ifthe risk premium grew by only enough to leave
the real exchange rate unchanged, this still would not
be a stable equilibrium because capital inflows would be
needed to service the interest on the accumulation of U.S.
external debt, resulting in a further increase in the risk
premium. Thus, servicing the accumulated debt without
capital inflows (as required for a stable equilibrium in this
case) requiresthat the risk premium rise enough to cause
thereal value ofthe dollar todepreciate, thereby generating
an increase in U.S. net exports to balance the current
account. This is illustrated in Figure 3.10
Exchange Rate Equation in the FRBSF Model
In summary, then, movements in the exchange rate
depend, in part, on the market's expectation of the real
valueof the dollar in long-run equilibrium, or the long-run
"anchor" for the dollar in equation (1). The market's
expectation of the dollar's long-run anchor, in tum, is
shaped by expectations of the impact of future domestic
and foreign fiscal policies." To the extent investors alter
their expectations of future fiscal policy in response to
current changes in fiscal policy, the dollar's anchor will be
affected and the current value of the exchange rate will
change. Under the assumption of perfect asset substituta-
bility,or at least aconstantrisk premium, expectations of a
sustained U.S. fiscal expansion will cause the long-run
anchor for the dollar to rise and the dollar to appreciate.
However, if investors expect that within their investment
horizon the fiscal expansion will significantly increase the
risk premium between foreign and domestic assets, the
long-run anchor for the dollar could fall and the current
value of the dollar could tend to depreciate.
The exchange rate equation in the FRBSF macroecono-
metric model enables us empirically to examine these
important expectational effects. High employment, or
structural, budget balances as a percent of high-employ-
ment GNP are used asan approximate measure oftheover-
all impact of fiscal policy. Structural budget balances are
preferable to actual (non-cyclically-adjusted) balances
because they isolate better the goods market pressures
associated with fiscal policy shifts .12
Howexpectations of these budget balances areformedis
an open question. The conventional approach assumes that
future budget balances are independent of current budget
balances, so that the expected real value of the dollar is a
constant determined by a condition of purchasing power
parity, possibly modified by a time trend.'> In contrast,
the approach taken here allows for the possibility that
a rational expectation of budget balances at home and
abroad over the relevant investment horizon should de-
pend, at least in part, on current budget balances. Specifi-
cally,the effects of anticipated budgetsurpluses ordeficits
are modeled asa function of afour-quarter moving average
of current budget balances. 14
The logarithm of the expected real value of the dollar in
the long run is thus assumed to vary with the current U.S.
budget balance (B), and a weighted average of current
foreign budget balances (B*).15 The signs of the coeffi-
cients on the budget balances depend upon the length of
the market's investment horizon and whether the market













Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 31Substituting, equation (2) into equation (1) yields the
exchange rate equation to be estimated as:
substitutes within that investment horizon. The magni-
tudes of the coefficients on the budget balances depend, in
part, upon the size of the response of expected budget
balances to changes in current budget balances.
As pointed out earlier, the differential on long-term real
interestrates has amore stable impact onmovementsinthe
real exchange rate. This real bond rate differential can be
decomposed into the nominal bond rate differential and an
expected inflation differential. The nominal bond rate
differential is modeled as a distributed lag on current and
past differentials in nominal short-term interest rates,
following the standard expectations model of the term
structure of interest rates. The expected inflation differ-
ential is similarly modeled as a distributed lag on current
and past values of the differential in quarterly inflation
rates, but with separately estimated weights to allow for
the possibility that the process of expectation formation
may differ fornominal interest rates and inflation. The sum
ofthe weights on the inflation differential is constrained to
be the same as the sum of the weights on the nominal
interest rate differential, but with an opposite sign. Both
Individual coefficients, t statistics, summary statistics,
and exact estimation periods for this and other estimated
equations are shown in the Appendix. Thereal interest rate
differential is found to have a highly significant influence
upon the real exchange rate, in accordance with the con-
ventional view of exchange markets. A sustained one-
percentage point change in the real short-term interest rate
differential is estimated to produce a 10percent change in
the real trade-weighted value of the dollar in the same
direction. The magnitude of this effect is consistent with
an average horizon for investors in the foreign exchange
market of 10years.'?
Signs of the estimated coefficients on U.S. and foreign
budget deficits indicate that market participants view U.S.
and foreign assets as close substitutes. Their magnitudes
suggest that theyviewchanges instructural budget deficits
foreign interest rates and foreign inflation are measured on
a trade-weighted basis.
The Board of Governors' index of the trade-weighted
valueof thedollar is used, andtheforeign interest rates and
budget balances are for the ten countries in this index.!"
The resulting equation for the real value of the dollar,
estimated over the entire floating rate period, is:
18 18
InEXCH = 3.44 + i"!:oaJis-i.;) + i"!:obJP-P*) (4)
- .0574B + .0773B*+1.02e_1 - .373e~2
18 18
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32 Economic Review I Summer 1989as being relatively permanent. Thus, a one-percentage
point reduction in the current U.S. structural budget sur-
plus as a percent of high-employmentGNP isestimated to
produce a six percent appreciation in the expected real
trade-weighted value of the dollar, while a similar reduc-
tion in the weighted average of foreign budget surpluses
depreciates the dollar by nearly eight percent. The dif-
ferencein these coefficients isnotsurprising, giventhatthe
combined GNP of the foreign countries exceeds thatof the
United States. Moreover, these expectational effects are
relatively large. In the FRBSFmodel, it wouldtake about a
nine percent appreciation in the real value of the dollar to
reduce the trade balance sufficiently to fully offset the
effect on aggregate demand from a one-percentage point
reduction in the U.S. budget surplus, or in other words, to
result in afull crowding out through the trade balance. The
six percent appreciation generated by the expectational
effects of aU.S. budget surplus is fully two-thirds of this.
A plot of actual and predicted values from this equation
forthe whole period of floating exchange rates since 1973
(excluding serial correlation terms in predicted values) is
shown in Chart 1. The overall fit is quite good. Although
the variables in the equation do not explain the strength of
the dollar in 1985 very well, this was a period when short-
term speculative factors appear to have been particularly
important. It is of particular interest that the equation
tracks the major movements in the dollar quite well even
though it ignores the potential effects of central bank
interventions in the exchange market, except insofar as the
latter influence interest rates. This result is consistent with
theexchange rate model's basic premise of highly substitu-
table private capital.
Chart2decomposes thepredictedreal valueofthedollar
into its various components. From 1973 to 1980, the real
value ofthe dollar dropped by 25 percent. The effects on
expectations of the shift in the U.S. government budget
toward surplus and the shifts in foreign government bud-
gets toward deficits account for practically all of this
depreciation. IS The differential between U.S. and foreign
real long-term interest rates rose until 1975, tending to
push the real value of the dollar up during this period, but
by 1980, the differential had returned to its 1973 level,
reinforcing the tendency for the dollar to fall.
Between 1980 and 1985, the real value of the dollar
appreciated sharply by 55 percent. The effect of the U.S.
budget deficit on market expectations was the largest
contributor to this appreciation. The change in expecta-
tions arising from the growing budget deficit accounts for
about 40 percent of the total increasein thereal valueof the
dollar in this period. Foreign budgets generally were
moving from deficit into surplus, with the associated
expectational effects contributing about 20 percent of the
increase in the dollar's value. Finally, a rising real interest
differential accounts for about 20 percent of the dollar's
appreciation, with the remaining appreciation apparently
due to speculative factors.
Chart 2
Contributions of Various Factors
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 33foreign real short-term interest rate to changes in the U.S.
real short-term interest rate in the FRBSF model is:
Il(i:-p~*) = .2351l((,-p~) + .143Il(i,-P~)_1 (5)
+ .1601l(is - p~) 2
+.0091l(is-P~)-3 + .222e_1
The short-term inflationary expectations that enter into
short-term real interest rates at home and abroad. are
modeled by a four-quarter moving average of the inflation
rate. Summing the coefficients on the lagged real interest
rates suggests that foreign central banks have matched
about 55 percent of the change in U.S. real short-term
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Realexports (GEX82) are modeled as a function ofreal
GNP in the U.S.' ten major industrial trading partners
(ROWGNP82) and the real trade-weighted value of the
dollar (EXCH). The equation for exports is:
2
InGEX82 = - .811 + .2- a_ i InROWGNP.H
1=0
9
+ .2- b i InEXCH i + .774e_1 1=2
9
2- bi., = - .523
i=2
Real nonpetroleum imports (NPM82) are related in a
similar fashion to U.S. GNP and the real trade-weighted
value of the dollar.F" Real imports of petroleum (PM82)
historically have been subject to a number of special
factors, including for a time, a complex system of controls
on U.S. production. But after 1974, the ratio of petroleum
imports to GNP has been significantly and negatively
related to the real price of oil (POlL), as theory would
suggest under stable domestic supply conditions. Oil im-
ports have not been significantly related to the real ex-
change rate in the expected direction, however, partly
because imports are priced in dollars, and so are not
immediately affected by changes in the valueof the dollar.
Moreover, in the longer run, the response of foreign oil
suppliers to the movement inthe real valueofthedollarhas
been quite erratic. The two import functions are:
2
InNPM82 = -20.1 + i2-
0a- i InGNP82 i
9
+ .2- b_ i InEXCH-i + .797e_1 1=0
9
2- b_i = +.384
i=O
ReactionsofForeign CentralBanks
In modelling the exchange rate and the trade balance,
one needs to take into account the reactions of foreign
central banks to changes in U.S. interest rates. Floating
exchange rates have diminished the short-run monetary
linkages among national real interest rates. Nonetheless,
foreign central banks continue to pursue macroeconomic
stabilization and so, continue to respond to changes in
U.S. interest rates, though to a lesser extent than before.
For example, foreign central banks tend to allow foreign
interest rates to rise in response to a rise in US. rates, to
prevent capital outflows and adepreciation of their curren-
cies that would result in an increase in aggregate demand
and higher output and inflation. However, matching the
rise in U.S. interest rates exactly wouldhaveadeflationary
impact on foreign economies. As a result, foreign central
banks have tended to match some, but not all, of the
changes in US. real interest rates in an effort to stabilize
aggregate demand.
The estimated response function of the trade-weighted
During the period from 1985 to 1988 when the dollar
depreciated sharply, the combined effect of changes in the
U.S. and foreign budget deficits on the long-run expecta-
tion of the dollar contributed only 10 percent of the total
depreciationin the realvalueofthedollar.Incontrast to the
precedingperiod, thedeclining real long-term interest rate
differential accounted for nearly 75 percent of the total
decline in the real value of the dollar. The declining real
interestrate differential, in turn, wasprimarily due to both
the decline in the US. real bond rate that followed mone-
tary disinflation in the United States and a rising trade-
weighted foreign real bond rate. Foreign central banks
raised their interest rates in response to the effects of the
persistently strong dollar.These movementsin real interest
rates were conducive to a better domestic macroeconomic
equilibrium and wereconsistent with the Plaza Agreement
of September 1985, in which the Group of Five agreed to
cooperate in reducing the value of the dollar.
Other Aspects ofthe International Sector
ofthe FRBSF Model
The remainder of this section briefly discusses the
response of the trade balance and inflation to changes in
the exchange rate, as modelled in the FRBSF macroecono-
metric model. These equations are similar to those in most
large-scale econometric models, although this model is
relatively small in size.'? Since the model is fully docu-
mented elsewhere (Throop[1989]), onlythemost pertinent
aspects of the international sector are described here.
34 Economic Review / Summer 1989In(PM82/GNP82) = (8)
- .291 + .897 In(PM82/GNP82) 1
- .137InPOIL - .251e I
Theoverall fitof theexport and importequations isquite
good, as shown in plots of actual and predicted values in
Charts 3 and 4 (excluding serial correlation terms from the
predicted values). The absolute value of the price elasticity
of demand for exports exceeds that for nonpetroleum
imports, consistent with other recent work.>' The lags on
the real exchange rate are much longer than on GNPin the
case of both exports and imports. Also, the elasticity of
U.S. nonpetroleum imports with respect to U.S. GNP is
3.01, substantially exceeding the 1.75 elasticity of U.S.
exports with respect to foreign GNP. This difference may
be due to pure income effects; or it may be capturing the
effect of different rates of productivity growth in tradable
goods at home and abroad. 22
Inflation and the Dollar
In the FRBSF macroeconometric model, movements in
the real value of the dollar havea significant impact on the
price level. The inflation equation in the model may be
characterized as an expectations-augmented Phillips curve
that includes the effects of "supply shocks" from changes
in the real price of oil and the real value of the dollar. The
civilian unemployment rate (LHUR), adjusted forchanges
in the natural rate of unemployment due to demographics
(U*), is used to measure excess demand, and the expected
rate of inflation is measured by a distributed lag on past
inflation. Changes in the real value of the dollar influence
prices both directly through prices of imports, and indi-
rectly through competitive effects on domestic prices of
exports and import substitutes. The Phillips curve equa-
tion captures these relationships by including a distributed
lag on current and past changes in the real trade-weighted
valueofthe dollar. A second type of "supply shock" to the
price level comes from the real price of oil. Changes in the
real price of oil alter the mark-up of prices over unit labor
costs by changing the price of an important non-labor
input. A distributed lag on the percentage change in the
real price of oil captures this effect. The estimatedinflation
equation is:
• 11 .
GDF = .0847 - .600(LHUR U*)+.2: ai GDF-i (9)
1=2
4 . 6 .
+2: hi POIL_ 1 +2: ciEXCH + .388e_ 1 1 0 1=0
11 4 6
where: 2: a i = 1.0 2: hi= .0389 2: ci = - .0794
i=2 i=O i=O
The sum of the estimated coefficients on past inflation is
not significantly different from one, and so it isconstrained
to that value. The lag on past inflation extends about three
years. These results imply a vertical long-run Phillips
curve in which, absent supply shocks, the rate of inflation
at full employment is equal to the rate of inflation inherited
from the past. Equivalently, they reflect an accelerationist
view that excess demand, or an unemployment rate below
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full employment, leads to a continuing acceleration in the
inflation rate.23
A 10percent change in the real price of oil is estimated
to change the U.S. price level by 0.4 percent in the same
direction overfivequarters; and a 10percent change in the
real trade-weighted value of the dollar moves the price
level by 0.8 percent in the opposite direction over seven
quarters. Because of the role of the dollar in the inflation
equation, a fiscal expansion in the FRBSF model causes
thereal valueofthedollarto appreciate, pricesto drop,and
the real stock of moneyto expand-relieving some of the
pressure on interest rates and allowing real GNP toexpand
by more than it otherwise would.
III. Effects of a Fiscal Expansion
This sectioncompares the estimated responses of inter- the exchange rate equation. The results of this simulation
est rates, the dollar, and the trade balance to a fiscal are compared with those from the conventional framework
expansion obtained from the FRBSF model with those which, effectively, changes only the firstof these variables
obtained from the more conventional frameworkin which from its historical path.
the market's expectation of the future real value of the Table 1shows the results of these simulations as devia-
dollar is unaffected by current fiscal policy. To represent tions from the historical baseline path. In all of the
the conventionalframework, thecoefficientsonthebudget simulations, real governmentspending isincreased by $32
balances intheFRBSF model's exchange rate equation are billion in the first quarter, with this increment growing to
set equal to zero. I assume for a baseline the actual path of $38.8 billion by the 32nd quarter. Simulation A showsthe
the economyfrom 1981 through 1988. Monetary policy is results from the conventional framework. After two quar-
defined interms of the actual path of nominalM2, which I ters, real GNP rises to a maximum of $44.8 billion, but
initially assume is unaffected by the fiscal expansion. A then turns down as the lagged effects of higher interest
simple fiscal change is examined, namely a permanent rates and an inventory adjustment produce a cyclical
increase in government spending equal to one percent of downturn. TheU.S. real bondrate rises steadily becauseof
high-employment GNP. persistent pressure from higher government spending on
For simulating this fiscal expansion with the complete short-term interest rates. After 32 quarters, the U.S. real
FRBSF model, only two exogenous variables are changed bond rate has risen 151 basis points, and the differential
from their historical paths. These are the value of govern- between U.S. and foreignreal bond rates has increased by
ment spendingitselfand theratioofthecyclically-adjusted 64 basis points. As a consequence, the real trade-weighted
budget balance to high-employment GNP that appears in value of the dollar has appreciated 6.9 percent above its
36 Economic Review / Summer 1989baseline path. This produces a $16.3 billion decline in
real net exports. At this point, interest rates have nearly
peaked, and the impactofthe fiscal expansionon thedollar
and the trade balance is near its maximum. Even so, only
40 percent of the crowding out occasioned by increased
government spending falls on net exports.
The response of the real exchangerate and net exports to
a fiscal expansion in the complete FRBSF model, which
includes the effectsof changesin the expectedlongrun real
value of the dollar, is quite different. As shown in Column
B of Table 1, after four quarters, the size of the increase in
the real bond rate, and the differential between it and the
foreign real bond rate, is about the same as in Column A.
But the dollarappreciates significantly more in Simulation
B-7.3 percent, versus 1.2 percent-because of the ex-
pectations effect. This stronger appreciation, in tum, pro-
duceslarger reductions in net exports and actual declines
indomestic prices in subsequent quarters. The larger
increase in thereal stock of money from lower prices
combines with thelargerdecrease in net exports to pull the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 37ment as domestic prices adjust, so that fiscal policy will
affect only the composition of output. Simulation C ap-
proximates this longer-run solution in the context of the
complete FRBSF model by raising the path of nominal
interest rates about 11 basis points above that in Simulation
B, so that after 32quarters real GNP returns to its baseline
path.
In this long-run solution, there is an extra 31 basis point
increase in the U.S. real bond rate and an extra 1.7
percentage point appreciation in the real valueof the dollar
compared with Simulation B. But the incidence of crowd-
ing out does not change significantly. About 80 percent
the crowding out from higher government spending con-
tinues tofall on net exports, with the remainder falling on
interest-sensitive consumption and investment. I estimate
that the real value of the dollar would haveto appreciate by
nine percent to make crowding out fall entirely on net
exports. It actually appreciates by 7Y2 percent in this
longer-run simulation. Roughly six percentage points of
the appreciation are due to the expectational effect of
the fiscal expansion, while the remaining 1Y2 percentage
points are caused by the rise in the real bond rate differ-
ential. Thus, in the longer run, expectational effects con-
tinue to be more important than interest rate effects in
appreciating the dollar, and the strongerdollar continues to
be more importantthan interest rates indetermining which
components of aggregate demand will bear the brunt of
crowding out.
u.S. real bond rate back to the baseline path by 28
quarters. The real value of the dollar remains high, sup-
ported by expectational effects, even though the U.S. real
bond rate and the differential between it and the foreign
real bond rate return to their baseline levels.
Between four and 32quarters in Simulation B, the real
trade-weighted value of the dollar fluctuates between 8
percentand 5Y2 percent above its baseline path. As a result
ofthe higher dollar, net exports fall rapidly, reaching close
to their maximum amount ofdecline after only 16 quarters.
Thus, in Simulation B, real net exports decline by $27.7
billion after 12 quarters and by $31.0 billion after 32
quarters, compared with $14.3 billion and $16.3 billion,
respectively, in Simulation A. By incorporating the expec-
tational effect in Simulation B, not only does the dollar
appreciate much faster, but also after the first year there is
much less pressure on real interest rates. This outcome
puts a significantly higher proportion of the crowding out
from a fiscal expansion on net exports. In the period from
12 to 32 quarters after the fiscal expansion, 80 percent of
the crowding out associated with the increment to govern-
ment spending falls on net exports in the FRBSF model,
compared with only about 40 percent in the conventional
framework.
After 32 quarters, real GNP in Simulation B is still
$10.5 billion higher than the baseline path, due to both the
interestelasticityof moneydemand and theincrease inreal
M2 produced by the dollar's appreciation. In the long run,
however, the economy will tend to return to full employ-
IV. Summary andConclusions
This paper synthesizes two major strands in the litera-
ture on open-economy macroeconomics that deal with the
linkages among fiscal policy, the dollar, and international
trade. Assuming perfect capital mobility and perfect asset
substitutability, as well as an instantaneous adjustment of
expectations, Mundell (1963) showed that a fiscal expan-
sion can attract net capital inflows without any increase in
the differential between domestic and foreign real interest
rates. Under the same assumptions with regard to capital
mobility and asset substitutability, the conventional short-
run dynamic analysis of asset equilibrium, expounded by
Dornbusch (1976), Frankel (1979) and others, implies that
a fiscal expansion will attract net capital inflows only
insofar as it increases the differential between domestic
and foreign real interest rates. My analysis suggests that
both the interest rate differential and expectations matter.
The international sector of the FRBSF macroeconometric
modelprovides a synthesis by embedding arational expec-
tations model of the dollar's longer-runequilibriuminto the
short-run dynamics of asset equilibrium. This is done by
38
including expected fiscal balances for the U.S. and other
countries along with the interest rate differential in the
exchange rate equation.
My econometric estimates suggest that expected budget
balances are significant determinants of long-run expecta-
tions of the exchange rate. These estimates also indicate
that market participants believe that an expansionary fiscal
policy will appreciate, rather than depreciate, thereal value
of the dollar in the long run, suggesting that they do not
expect risk premia to be significantly affected by the
change in U.S. fiscal policy. Thus, the economy's adjust-
ment to a fiscal expansion is similar to that originally
proposed by Mundell. Interest rates rise by less, and the
value of the dollar rises faster and farther than in conven-
tional macroeconometric models, where the real value of
the dollar is determined solely by the differential between
U.S. and foreign real interest rates. As a result, a fiscal
expansion rapidly crowds out a relatively large amount of
net exports.
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Selected FRBSF Econometric Model Equations
B. FOREIGN REAL SHORT-TERM
INTEREST RATE
p~) + .1430s - p~) 1
(1.99)
A. REAL EXCHANGE RATE
18 18
InEXCH = 3.44 + .~ aJis-i;)_; + .~ bJp-p*) i
(6.66) 1-0 1-0
- .0574B + .0773B* + 1.02e -r i - .373e_2
(-3.09) (2.06) (7.50) (-2.75)
!l0; - P ~*) = .235 !lOs
(3.32)
+ .160AOs - p~)-2 + .009 !lOs
(2.23) (0.13)
P~L3 + .222e ~l
(1.69)
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0 .00849 - .00279
1 .00829 .00756
2 .00806 - .00716
3 .00781 - .00780
4 .00754 .00781
5 .00724 - .00775
6 .00692 .00761
7 .00658 .00741
8 .00621 - .00713
9 .00582 - .00678
10 .00541 - .00636
11 .00497 - .00587
12 .00450 - .00531
13 .00402 - .00467
14 .00351 - .00396
15 .00298 - .00318
16 .00242 - .00233
17 .00184 - .00141
18 .00123 -.00041




































EXCH = real trade-weighted value ofthe dollar
i = U.S. short-term interest rate
i* = foreign trade-weighted short-term interest rate
p = U.S. inflation rate
p* = trade-weightedforeign inflation rate
B = 4 quarter moving average of us. budget
balance
B* = 4 quarter moving average ofweighted foreign
budget balance




Sample Period: 1972:Q4 - 1987:Q4
GEX82 = exports in billions of1982 dollars
ROWGNP82 = GNP in 1982 dollars of10 major indus-
trial trading partners
EXCH = real trade-weighted value ofdollar
39D.NONPETROLEUMIMPORTS F.INFLATIONa
2
lnNPM82 = - 20.1 + ~ a i lnGNP82
(_15.0) i=O
9
+ .~ bi., lnEXCH-i + - .797e_1
1=0 (8.85)
II
GDF = .0847 - .600 (LHUR - U*) + i~2ai GDF_ i
(0.41) (-3.86)
4 6
+ ~ hi POlL i + .~ ci EXCH + .388e I
i=O 1=0 ~.m)
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Sample Period: 1975.Q1 - 1987.Q4
-.137lnPOlL -.25Ie_1
(- 2.06) (- 1. 72)
In(PM82/GNP82)= - .291+ .897ln(PM82/GNP82) I
(-1.61) (17.2)
Sample Period: 1958:Q2 - 1987:Q4
a The personal consumption deflator is used to deflate the
nominal stock ofM2 in the FRBSF model. However, its
rate ofchange is afunction ofthe rate ofinflation in the
GNP fixed-weighted price index.
GDF = annualized percent change in GNP fixed-
weighted price index
LHUR = civilian unemployment rate
U* = measure of variation in the civilian unem-
ployment rate due to demographics
POlL = annualized percent change in real price of
crude oil
EXCH = annualized percent change in real trade-
weighted value ofdollar
= nonpetroleum imports in 1982 dollars
= GNP in 1982 dollars










= petroleum imports in 1982 dollars
= GNP in 1982 dollars
= real price ofcrude petroleum
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1. Foran overview of these simulation results, see Helkie
and Hooper (1988) and Bryant and Holtham (1988).
2. Mundell (1963) assumed static expectations with re-
gardtothe exchange rate in the sense that the exchange
rate inthe future is expected to be the same as today's
exchange rate. As discussed below, however, a rational
adjustment of the market's long run expectat!o~ of the
dollar to changes in the current budget deficit has a
sirnilareffect on the incidence of the fiscal change. The
most forceful recent proponents of this view have.been
Dornbusch (1983)and Blanchard and Dornbus~h (1~84).
Foran earlier comparison of these two alternative Views,
seeHutchison and Throop (1985).For recent surveys that
put Mundell's contribution into historical per~pe~tiveand
further discuss some of the issues covered In this paper,
see Frankel and Razin (1987) and Marston (1985).
3. The FRBSF macroeconometric model is fully de-
scribed.in Throop (1989).
4. In technical terms, previous research indicates that
risk premia on internationally-traded assets are small,
varywithtime, and are difficultto associate systematically
with structural variables. See Danker, et. a/. (1984), Fran-
kel (1982), and Hutchison and Throop (1985).
Although Mundell (1963) implicitly took perfect mobility
to require perfect substitutability, current writers generally
take perfect capital mobility to mean only an absence of
substantial transaction costs, capital controls, or other
impediments to the flow of capital between countries. This
definition of perfect capital mobility implies that t.~e ex-
change rate would adjust instantaneously to equilibrate
the international demand for stocks of national assets, as
opposed to the more traditional viewof adjusting toequili-
brate the international demand for flows of goods and
capital. But it leaves open the ques!ion whether dOf!1estic
and foreign assets are perfect or Imperfect substitutes.
SeeDornbusch and Krugman (1976)and Frankel (1983).
5. Fora survey of the most important mUlticou~try econo-
metricmodels, see Bryant, et.a/.(1988),especially Chap-
ters 3 and 5. Additional detail on these models may be
found in Part I of the Supplemental Volume.
6. The asset theory of exchange markets was pioneered
by Dornbusch (1976a) and Frankel (1979). See also
Hooper and Morton (1982) and Hutchison (1982)for ap-
plications of the asset view. A useful general survey of
modern exchange rate theory is Shafer and Loopesko
(1983).
7. The open interest parity condition in nominal terms is:
Ins - Inse = n(i - i*)
wheres is the nominal value of the dollar, defined as units
offoreign currency per unit of domesticcurrency, andseis
the expected value of the nominal exchange rate. By
definition
p*
s = EXCH P
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
and p* (1 + pe*)n
se = EXCHe p(1 + peyn
where EXCHis the real exchange rate and p and p* are
the U.S. and foreign price levels, respectively. Taking
logarithms and substituting into the arbitrage equation in
nominal terms gives equation (1) in the text.
In theory, the relevant interest rate differential sh?uldbe
after taxes. Although marginal tax rates on real Interest
income differ among industrial countries, no estimates of
these rates are available. For a survey of and some
background papers on what is known about how interest
income and foreign exchange gains and losses aretaxed
in various countries, see Tanzi (1984).
8. Theultimate equilibrium at LM3 and IS3 is similar tothat
in Mundell's (1963) classic analysis, in which the dollar
appreciates without any increase in the equil.ibrium real
interest rate differential. Mundell assumed static expecta-
tions with respect to the exchange rate (meaning that the
exchange rate expected in the ~uture is the s~r:ne. as
today's exchange rate),allowing this short-run equilibrium
to be reached immediately. Also, he ignored the effect of
the currency appreciation on the LM schedule, so!hat the
ISschedule shifted all the way from IS2 to 151, leading to a
full crowding out of net exports by the fiscal expansion.
9. Because real interest rates equalize inthe long run,the
dollar appreciates without any increase in the equilibriu~
real interest rate differential, just as in Mundell's claSSIC
analysis of a small country with fixed prices. T~e dif-
ference in this two-country, full-employment case IS that
because the world interest rate rises,there issome crowd-
ing out of U.S. domestic investment, and possibly con-
sumption, in addition to net exports. Howev~r, the smaller
is the country with the fiscal expansion relative to the rest
of theworld, the greater isthe crowding out of netexports.
Crowding out from fiscal expansion in a country small
enough to have no significant impac~ on w?rld Intere~t
rateswould fall entirely on net exports, Just as InMundell s
small country case with fixed prices.
A further point is that the crowding out of world-wide
capital formation by a U.S. fiscal expan.s.io~ gr~dually
shifts up the locus of full-employment eqUlllbnu~. In both
countries as capital becomes scarcer, thus raiSing real
interest rates at full employment in both countries. Since
this shifts up the schedules of both countries, there is no
necessary impact on the realvalue of the dollar. Howev~r,
if consumption spending is a function of net w~alth, as IS
commonly believed, the increase in the r~latlve .wealth
pcsition of the foreign country would shift up It? full-
employment equilibrium relatively more, th~s tending to
depreciate the dollar. To the extent that I.nvestors. e~­
pected the fiscal expansion to have such an Impact Within
their investment horizon, the current value of the dollar
could be affected. Whether this is in fact the case is an
empirical matter.
4110. Branson (forthcoming) and Sachs (1985) have con-
structed formal models in which the risk premium in an
open-interest parity condition varies over time in propor-
tion to relative debt positions. Krugman (1985, 1988) cor-
rectly points out, however, that risk premiums should also
enter into the expected long-run value of the dollar, con-
sistent with Figure 3. But he suggests in addition that the
market has not correctly assessed the limit to absorption
of dollar-denominated assets by the rest of the world. The
implication that expectations in the foreign exchange
market are irrational, is hard to accept.
Rather, it is more realistic to assume there is a relatively
large potential world demand for dollar assets. The dollar
is universally accepted as a means of international pay-
ment and serves as an international store of value to
an extent unmatched by any other asset. Moreover, the
breadth, depth, and resilience of U.S. financial markets
provide a degree of liquidity not available in other assets.
As a result, only a small increase in the U.S. real interest
rate relative to the foreign real interest rate likely would be
required to ensure continued external financing of the
U.S. payments deficit. As a consequence, over relatively
long time horizons, the expectation of a relatively perma-
nent U.S. budget deficit is more likely to lead to an
increase in the expected long-run equilibrium in the real
value of the dollar than a decrease, consistent with the
empirical results discussed below. For a further defense
of this view, see Cheng (1988).
11. The analysis shown in Figures 2 and 3 makes it clear
that the expected real value of the dollar also should
depend on the expected rate of private saving at home
and abroad. Although the U,S, private saving rate de-
clined significantly in the 1980s, prior to that it had been
stable over a long period of time, (See Denison [1958] and
David and Scad ding [1974],) The question whether ex-
pectations of long-run private saving rates have changed
significantly is beyond the scope of this article,
12, They are only approximate because the marginal
effects of government spending, transfer payments, and
various taxes on aggregate demand are not exactly the
same, The budgetary data are combined federal, state,
and local balances compiled by the OECD, Sources of
these data are Price and Muller (1984) and recent issues
of the OEeD Economic Outlook,
Both inflation-adjusted and unadjusted structural bud-
get balances were tried, Unadjusted structural budget
balances count the inflation premium in interest paid on
government debt as an outlay, but do not count the
corresponding erosion in the real value of this debtdue to
inflation as a receipt. The inflation-adjusted structural
budget balance corrects this by including the erosion in
the value of the debt as tax revenue, These two measures
performed equally well in the exchange rate equation,
But evidence from the consumption function in the
FRBSF econometric model, as well as empirical work by
Eisner and Peiper (1984) and Price and Muller (1984) that
shows real growth in the United States and Europe to be
more closely related to movements in inflation-adjusted
budgetbalances than to unadjusted ones, supports using
the adjusted measure, The inflation-adjusted measure
is consistent with households' behaving rationally and
therefore saving (and reinvesting) inflation premiums in
the interest on government debt.
Because of this behavior, the private saving rate as
conventionally measured should tend to rise and fall with
theinflation rate. This response of the private saving rate
to inflation is particularly evident in European countries
that-have experienced sharp changes in inflation, How-
ever, it is obscured in the U.S, data by simultaneous
movements inthe ratio of realwealth to income, which also
influence the saving rate ina life-cycle model of consump-
tion, For further discussion of the inflation-adjusted meas-
ure, seeJump(1980),Siegel (1979), and Tanzi,Blejer, and
Teijero (1987),
13, See, for example, Bryant, et. al. (1988), Bryant and
Holtham (1988), and Helkie and Hooper (1988),
14, The alternative of budget balances over four quarters
ahead did not perform as well. Neither did distributed lags
on current and past budget balances,
15, Trade-weights clearly are appropriate for combining
the rest of the world's real interest rates since that is the
way the exchange rate is constructed, However, in the
case of the structural budgets, the relative size of the
country also is important. The larger the country, the
smaller trade generally will be as a proportion of GNP, and
the flatter will be its full employment locus in Figures 2
and 3, Therefore, the impact of a one-percentage point
change in the country's structural budget on its real
bilateral exchange rate with the U,S, would be greater the
larger is the size of that country's economy, Thus, the
weight for the foreign budget balances that I used is the
trade-weight times the relative GNP-weight.
Since the relative effects of domestic and foreign bud-
get balances on the real exchange rate depend upon the
relative size ofthe U.S.and the rest of the world, there isno
reason that the coefficients on the two budget balances
should be constrained to be of equal absolute value, as is
the case with U.S. and foreign interest rates.
16. Multilateral trade weights are used. See Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1978). The
nominal index is deflated by the ratio of trade-weighted
foreign consumer prices to the U.S. GNP fixed-weight
price index.
17. Hooper (1985,1987) estimates a six percent change
in the real exchange rate for a one-percentage point
change in the real interest rate differential. He uses inter-
est rates on securities with maturities that are usually 10
years, but sometimes less.
18. Although the standard measure of the U.S. federal
fiscal deficit as a percent of high-employment GNP rose
and the state and local government balance was about
unchanged, there was a larger increase in the infla-
tion "tax" on government debt. Hence, the U.S. inflation-
adjusted structural budget balance rose, See footnote 12.
19, The FRBSF model has only 28 behavioral equations,
Economic Review / Summer 1989compared with 124 in the Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn
model (Brayton and Mauskopf, 1987), for example.
20. Weighted averages of domestic spending and do-
mestic output also were tried as scale variables, on the
theory that imports depend upon spending as well as
production, but they gave inferior results compared with
real GNP.
21. See Feldman (1982) and Warner and Kreinin (1983).
22. The measured difference in income elasticities would
implya need for the real value of the dollar to decline
secularly unless there is an offsetting difference in growth
rates of income at home and abroad. A classic study on
income elasticities in world trade, originally pointing out
the need for a seculardecline inthe realvalue ofthe dollar,
is Houthakker and Magee (1969). Subsequent literature
on income elasticities is surveyed in Goldstein and Kahn
(1985). A recent discussion of the effect of income elas-
ticities and productivity growth on the trend in the real
value ot.the dollar is provided in Krygman and Baldwin
(1987). A negative time trend to account for the possible
effectofthe difference in elasticities initially was included
in the equation for the exchange rate (equation (4)), but it
prpvedto be statistically insignificant.
23. TheJul1 employment rate of unemployment, at which
inflation tends neither to accelerate nor decelerate, is
estimated at 5% percent in the U.S. economy at present.
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